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In a 2014 case called National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning, the Supreme Court
blessed a method of interpretation known as “liquidation” that seeks to identify settled
practice as a means of understanding ambiguous constitutional text. Since then, scholars
like law professor Will Baude have elaborated on James Madison’s idea that resolving
constitutional vagaries can be achieved through identifying “a regular course of practice to
liquidate and settle [its] meaning.”
The petitioners in Colorado Department of State v. Baca picked up on this thread, citing Noel
Canning to argue that “well-established post-enactment understanding by the public [that
electors perform a mere ministerial role], coupled with longstanding historical practice,”
should be understood to establish that states may constitutionally penalize or remove
defecting electors.
In a recent law review article, “Liquidating Elector Discretion,” I challenge this narrative,
marshalling evidence that the opposite is true: that settled practice in fact assumes elector
discretion.
What does a liquidation analysis entail? Drawing on Madison’s writings, Baude identifies
three elements: (1) the presence of a discrete textual indeterminacy; (2) a course of
deliberate practice; and (3) actual settlement of the ambiguity revealed by institutional and
public acquiescence to the practice in question. What might this analysis reveal in resolving
the constitutionality of electors’ exercising discretion? Let’s take each in turn.
Textual indeterminacy
Textual ambiguity is clearly present. The 12th Amendment directs electors to “vote” by
“ballot,” but does not settle whether electors must be permitted to exercise discretion when
casting their ballots. Federal statutes add little meat to the bones on this question.
Aspects of this design have been litigated. For example, the Supreme Court held in Ray v.
Blair that political parties may require electors to take pledges to vote for a particular
candidate.
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But the Supreme Court has not resolved the question of whether states may punish or
remove electors who violate that pledge. The split between the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
10th Circuit in Baca and the Washington Supreme Court in Chiafalo v. Washington arises
from this textual indeterminacy.
Course of deliberate practice
On the second question, whether a course of deliberate practice establishes elector
discretion, four factors point to discretion as the default: frequency, geography, ballot
design and accountability.
Frequency. Electors have defected throughout U.S. history. According to FairVote, 165
electors have cast their vote for someone other than the candidate with the most votes in
their state (90 for president and 75 for vice president). Of those electors, 71 defected
because the candidate chosen by popular vote in their state died before the Electoral
College met (63 for president and 8 for vice president). Dozens of electors thus exercised
discretion to vote for someone other than the popular-vote winner in their state. If, in the
course of deliberate practice, electors played only a ministerial role, why the steady trickle of
defectors throughout the decades? It is not the case that electors used to defect and now do
not. 10 of the 18 most recent elections featured at least one defecting elector.
One might counter that the vast majority of Electoral College votes have tracked the
majority vote winner in their state—only .67 percent of electors have voted for candidates
other than the one they pledged to elect. But that something happens rarely does not mean
that its occurrence is not settled. By design, elector defection is meant to happen
infrequently. Electors will choose to follow popular will in their states unless extraordinary
circumstances demand. Electors sacrifice their political life and reputation to cast a faithless
vote for the perceived good of the nation. That defection happens rarely is an intended
feature of Electoral College design.
Geography. Defections have not clustered in one geographic region. Elector defections—
even excluding those resulting from the death of a candidate—have been dispersed
geographically, as the map below illustrates:
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*Includes Colorado’s 2016 faithless elector vote, the constitutionality of which
is currently before the court (FairVote)
Ballot design. If electors acted in a ministerial role only, how can we explain states’ routinely
handing electors ballots that clearly anticipate discretion? Here are two examples of many,
from Illinois (2008) and Texas (2016):
Even when elector ballots do not as clearly anticipate choice, it is hard to hand
an elector a ballot and a pen and expect otherwise, as Micheal Baca himself
demonstrated:
Accountability. One might expect, were it a deliberate course of practice to
deny electors discretion, that states would universally hold electors
accountable for cast votes. But evidence suggests that states have not always
done so. In 2004, for example, an elector defected in Minnesota, but no one
knew who it was because balloting had been conducted in secret. It appears
that no comprehensive study has been undertaken to determine the extent
to which electors have historically been held accountable for their vote. One
historian, writing in 1949, collected evidence
suggesting that quite a few states did not
require electors to sign their ballot or
otherwise be held to account (see row of
states in which the “Elector’s Vote [is] Neither
Signed nor Announced”):
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Faithless electors have appeared throughout U.S. history (albeit rarely), instances have been
geographically dispersed, states routinely hand electors ballots anticipating choice and
states do not uniformly require elector accountability. These realities undermine claims that
a “deliberate course of practice” relegates electors to an exclusively ministerial role.
Institutional and public acquiescence
The third prong of Baude’s framework requires examining “settlement,” or the degree of
institutional and popular acquiescence.
Institutional acquiescence. At the federal level, Congress has yet to turn away a faithless
elector’s vote. Undeniably the picture at the state level is muddled. But at least as of the
2008 presidential election, it appears that no state had punished a defecting elector. Why?
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One source suggested that states had not punished faithless electors because “experts
doubt[ed] that it would be constitutionally possible to do so.”
Popular acceptance. Widespread public calls for electors to vote their conscience in 2016
demonstrate that the public assumed that electors would have discretion when
extraordinary conditions arose. The 2016 election presented an atypical trifecta: The winner
of the popular vote failed to capture the White House, troubling evidence of foreign
interference in the election swirled and many believed the presumptive Electoral College
winner was unfit for office.
These unprecedented circumstances unleashed a torrent of popular pressure on electors to
defect. Americans lobbied electors through letter campaigns and newspaper opinion
columns. A “Conscientious Elector” petition at Change.org gained millions of signatures
imploring electors to cast their vote for the popular vote winner. Electors felt the heat. A
USA Today headline blared: “Harassment or Hail Mary? Electors feel besieged.” A Politico
story titled “Electors under siege” recounted how “once-anonymous electors are squarely in
the spotlight, targeted by death threats, harassing phone calls and reams of hate mail,”
noting that “[o]ne Texas Republican elector said he’s been bombarded with more than
200,000 emails.” Some states hired protection for besieged electors.
Massive popular pressure on electors to change their votes in 2016 demonstrates that the
American public fervently believed electors have discretion.
* * *
There are lots of reasons to doubt whether liquidation can resolve the constitutionality of
states’ binding electors. Liquidating the actions of federal bodies is much more
straightforward than attempting to nail down settled practice in 50 states and the District of
Columbia.
Also, importantly, as Baude describes, looking to settled practice is a form of constitutional
interpretation intended to minimize disruption. If the Supreme Court hands electors the
power to vote their conscience in November 2020 and they in fact upset the result, massive
protests would certainly erupt. The least disruptive path forward would be to allow states to
bind electors.
Where does this leave us? The petitioners in Baca assert that settled practice argues against
elector discretion. The above discussion provides fodder for the idea that Electoral College
norms and practice routinely anticipate elector discretion, and that institutions and the
populace generally accept it. But the argument that settled practice invariably points to
elector discretion is far from a slam dunk. Perhaps the safest ground is to conclude that
liquidation proves neither side adequately, despite the Colorado Department of State’s
assertion that it does.
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